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Abstract
We propose a uniﬁed framework for studying the greenback-gold price during the U.S.
suspension of convertibility from 1862 to 1879. The gold price is viewed as a ﬂoating ex-
change rate, with a ﬁxed destination given by gold standard parity because of the prospect
of resumption. We test this perspective using daily data for the entire period, and mea-
sure the eﬀect of news during and after the Civil War. New evidence of a decline in the
volatility of gold returns after the Resumption Act of 1875 provides statistical support for
the importance of expectations of resumption.
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Naomi Lamoreaux.This study examines the price of gold, denominated in greenbacks, during the period
of the U.S. suspension of convertibility from 1862 to 1879. We propose a new framework
for studying the gold-greenback price and provide tests of this framework in daily data
from the entire period. Our approach provides a uniﬁed perspective on previous studies,
and suggests several new tests. For example, we re-examine the eﬀects of war-time news
in this framework, and also use it to assess the eﬀects of the Resumption Act.
The approach begins from the observation that the gold price was approximately the
ﬂoating exchange rate, because European countries remained on the gold standard. How-
ever, it was widely anticipated that gold standard parity would be restored. Unlike most
ﬂoating exchange rates, then, the gold price had a ﬁxed destination: when specie pay-
ments were resumed in 1879 the gold dollar was worth one greenback. Both contemporary
obervers and later historians argued that expectations of resumption inﬂuenced the price
of gold. For example, Wesley Mitchell suggested that the price reﬂected war news and
ﬁnancial developments during the Civil War because those events informed gold traders
about the probability of resumption.1 More directly, Irving Fisher described the price after
the Resumption Act of 1875 as being determined by the terminal condition.2 Our frame-
work thus is a regime-switching model, in which the exchange rate regime switches from a
ﬂoat to a ﬁx. We allow for the fact that the time of the switch or resumption was uncertain
until at least 1875.
The gold price rose rapidly (the greenback depreciated) during the Civil War, and
so a resumption of parity would have brought large capital gains to holders of greenbacks
and capital losses to holders of gold. Therefore news which was likely to delay (hasten)
resumption should have raised (lowered) the price of gold. This paper conﬁrms the results
of previous event studies for the Civil War period, by examining the gold price at the time
of military and ﬁnancial news events catalogued by Mitchell. A new contribution is to
measure the cumulative eﬀect of these news events. We ﬁnd that the net eﬀect of news
was a fall in the price of gold, whereas the price actually rose by more that 30 percent
during the War. Thus other inﬂuences on the greenback-gold price more than oﬀset the
eﬀects of news during the War.
We also test for the importance of news in the post-war period, using a variety of
1events. Here we ﬁnd no evidence that discrete events were important, which suggests that
the causes of greenback appreciation were gradual and perhaps anticipated.
Although a number of researchers have studied the response of the gold price to news
events, especially during the Civil War, none has studied the implications of expected
resumption for the statistical properties of gold prices. We derive those properties in
detail, and ﬁnd that the path of the gold price is predicted to bend down, and returns
to holding gold to become less volatile over time, as resumption nears. Tests for these
properties for the period after the Resumption Act show that volatility did decline, which
is consistent with the view that expectations of resumption did inﬂuence the U.S. exchange
rate after 1875.
To test for the eﬀects of expected resumption we use daily gold prices from November
1861 to January 1879, which are shown in Figure 1. Mitchell collected the cash price of gold
(for same-day settlement) from American Gold, 1862-1878, published by J.C. Mersereau,
an oﬃcial of the gold exchange in New York, and from The Commerical and Financial
Chronicle.3 We use the highest daily gold dollar price of the greenback and invert it to
give the price of gold. The daily data allow a precise timing of news events and the
numerous observations allow statistical tests of the path for the exchange rate which the
regime-switching model implies.
A MODEL OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME SWITCHING
As we have noted, the gold price approximated the ﬂoating exchange rate, because
the sterling price of gold was ﬁxed throughout the period at $4.86 21
32. Multiplying the gold
price by the gold-sterling parity then yields the lowest daily greenback price of sterling.
Changes in the gold value of sterling, within the gold points, were very small relative to
changes in the greenback price of gold and so many studies have treated the latter price
as the exchange rate.4
However, most dollar/sterling exchange was conducted through bills of exchange,
(even after the transatlantic cable was installed in 1866) at rates which could diﬀer from
parity by a sterling premium which brieﬂy rose to 3 percent in 1863.5 Thus most deriva-
tions of exchange rate series for this period use bill prices and, with an interest-rate series,
2attempt to eliminate the interest factor in the bills leaving a measure of the spot exchange
rate.6 Estimates are then time averaged (as price quotations on bills of exchange are avail-
able only at irregular intervals) and reported at quarterly intervals. Our method has the
advantage of yielding daily observations, but our study is most precisely thought of as de-
scribing the greenback price of gold in New York, though we also refer to it as the exchange
rate.
To study the eﬀect of resumption expectations on the greenback price of gold, we
draw on recent research on regime-switching in exchange rates.7 In models of regime-
switching, policy-makers announce that the exchange-rate regime will change in the future,
for example from a ﬂoating to ﬁxed system. This approach is appropriate because the U.S.
resumption was widely anticipated. In this section we derive the implications of regime-
switching for the time series properties of the gold price so that we may then test the
historical relevance of this perspective.
Denote the logarithm of the greenback price of gold (or sterling) by e(t), which we
model in continuous time. The price is aﬀected by current fundamentals such as monetary
conditions and, like any asset price, by the expectation of capital gains or losses. Combining





where f(t) is a fundamental determinant of the relative price and Et denotes the expecta-
tion conditional on information at time t. This model captures the idea that the current
price of gold, e(t), partly reﬂects the anticipated price change, Et(de(t)/dt), with coeﬃcient
α. Equation (1) also may be thought of as the reduced form of the monetary model of the
exchange rate, in which case α represents the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
The diﬀerential equation (1) relates the current level of the gold price to its own
rate of change. As usual with diﬀerential equations, then, there are many mathematical
solutions. We therefore adopt the so-called no-bubbles condition, which gives a unique
solution by ruling out self-fulﬁlling, speculative bubbles. When there is a bubble, expected
appreciation sustains the price even if the asset has no fundamental value such as a dividend
or use in exchange. The asset price grows exponentially because the rate of appreciation
must exceed the interest or discount rate, which is the opportunity cost of holding the
3asset. There is no historical evidence which would suggest that there was a speculative
mania in gold, and so we use the no-bubbles condition which rules out gold prices which









so that the current price is the discounted value of future fundamentals. This present-value
model is widely used in exchange-rate modelling.8
We next make an assumption about the time series properties of fundamentals, f,
but not about their identity, for two reasons. First, we wish to exploit the daily data in
testing for the eﬀects of expected resumption, and macroeconomic fundamentals are not
available at that frequency. Second, economists have had very little success in explaining
ﬂuctuations in ﬂoating exchange rates with macroeconomic variables. Fundamentals which
have been suggested for the period from 1862 to 1878 include the greenback issue, federal
government budget deﬁcits, output growth, and the current account balance, but none
of these variables has been found statistically signiﬁcant.9 The method here allows us to
measure the resumption eﬀect in a relatively general way with results not conditioned on
a speciﬁc, complete theory of exchange-rate determination.
Assume that the fundamentals follow a Wiener process, which is a random walk (a
time series with unpredictable changes) in continuous time:
df (t)=μdt + σdz(t) (3)
where dz is a standard Wiener process. This is simply a drifting random walk; over a unit
interval, changes in f are independently and identically normally distributed with mean μ
and standard deviation σ.
If this path for the fundamental were expected to determine the price indeﬁnitely, then
forecasts based on the statistical description in equation (3) combine with the present-value
model in equation (2) to give
e(t)=f(t)+αμ (4)
so that the price or exchange rate e inherits the random walk property of the fundamental.
That is a resilient statistical model of a ﬂoating exchange rate.10 The random walk is
4appropriate in this context because the ﬂoat from 1862 to 1879 was marked by virtually
no intervention by the Treasury in the foreign exchange market, with the exception of
Secretary Chase’s ill-fated attempts from April to July 1864 to limit the increase in the gold
price and restrict transactions in the gold room, gold sales on Black Friday (24 September
1869), and the resumption eﬀect under study here.
Next, this standard model of nominal exchange rates is combined with a model of
resumption expectations to test the hypothesis that those expectations inﬂuenced the
price of gold. Denoting 1 January 1879 as T gives a terminal condition
e(T)=0 . (5)
When specie payments are resumed at prewar parity the price of a gold dollar is one
greenback dollar, which has a logarithm of zero.
With the terminal condition in equation (5) and fundamentals following equation (3)
until resumption, the solution to equation (2) becomes:11
e(t)=[ f(t)+αμ] · [1 − exp(
t − T
α




for t ≤ T. Equation (6) has two terms. The ﬁrst term is the pure ﬂoat solution multiplied
by a weight that declines over time as resumption is approached. The second term reﬂects
the terminal condition, multiplied by a weight that rises over time.
To summarize the implications of the model, we examine the rate of change of the
gold price, which is the return in greenbacks to holding gold. Gold returns in the presence
of future resumption have four key properties, which are formally derived in the Appendix.
The ﬁrst property concerns the eﬀect of news about the time of resumption. Although we
have not treated T as a random variable, it is a straightforward implication of equation
(6) that news which increases T will raise the price of gold, while news which reduces T
will lower the price of gold. This is property 1 (resumption news).12
The second property is that the relative price behaves like a random walk (the ﬁrst
term in equation (6)) when t is far less than T so that resumption is far in the future. As
t becomes larger the weights tilt towards the second term, which draws the price down
to 1 (its logarithm to 0) when t = T. We call this property 2 (declining gold returns).
5The value of α is important – large values give an important role to expectations of future
resumption in inﬂuencing current returns.13
The Appendix also shows that in the regime-switching model the gold price declines at
an increasing rate as T approaches. Thus the model also predicts that the most negative
returns to holding gold should be observed immediately prior to resumption. This is
property 3 (hard landing). Finally, the second term in equation (6) is not random and so,
as the weight on that term rises over time, the variance of returns declines over time. This
is property 4 (declining volatility of returns).
Properties 2, 3, and 4 are illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 2, which shows
a simulated gold price series. The series contains 1201 observations, the same as the
number of daily observations after the Resumption Act, and begins at a price of $1.12,
the actual price on 8 January 1875. The dashed line shows a simulation of the underlying
random walk, exp(f(t)), with a daily drift of μ = −0.0000001 and a variance of σ2 =
0.000002. The solid line shows exp(e(t)), with e(t) constructed from equation (6) and the
simulated random walk, with α = 500. By construction, the simulated price falls to parity
in December 1878.
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the actual gold price after the Resumption Act. The
volatility of the gold price appears to fall over time, as suggested by the theory. Comparison
of the two panels also seems to support the theory by showing that the simulated path
matches the actual path in reaching parity at the end of 1878, whereas the random walk
does not. But this simulation begs the question of whether drift in fundamentals, as
opposed to the pull of expected resumption, brought about this outcome. We shall later
estimate μ, σ2, and α to test formally for the eﬀects of expected resumption.
We next provide empirical evidence on each of the implications of the process-switching
model. Unlike properties 1 and 2, properties 3 and 4 of the process-switching model have
not been studied previously to our knowledge. T was not known prior to the passage of
the Resumption Act, and so we test only property 1 in data from that period. Then with
the data from the period from 1875 to 1879 we investigate properties 2, 3, and 4.
6WARTIME NEWS
The daily return to holding gold (expressed in greenbacks) is denoted rt =( et−et−1)·
100. Under the random walk model the average return to holding gold is simply μ, in the
absence of resumption news. According to property 1, news which suggests that T will
be delayed (advanced) raises (lowers) the return on gold, rt. To test for this eﬀect, we
estimate by least-squares the equation:
rt = μ + γ0dt + γ1dt−1 +  t, (7)
where dt is a set of dummy variables attached to news events. The lag of the dummy
variables allows for the diﬀusion of information. An example of this diﬀusion is provided
by the rumors concerning the battle of Chancellorsville, which was fought on 3 May 1863.
Reports favorable to the Union cause reached New York the next day. But over the
following several days it became clear that a disastrous defeat had occurred, and the net
eﬀect was a large rise in the price of gold.
Mitchell listed events which inﬂuenced the price of gold.14 He did not seek to make
his lists comprehensive, but rather to cite examples of events which led to gold price
movements. Thus our aim is not to show that these events were correlated with price
movements, for they were selected on this basis. Instead, we hope to learn whether they
accounted for an appreciable part of the variation in gold prices, and to measure the scale
of a typical movement.
We construct two dummy variables, aligned with his daily quotations on gold prices,
in order to study the role of these events. The ﬁrst, denoted dw, measures news of war or
diplomacy during the Civil War. It takes a value +1 on trading days on which there was
bad news for Union ﬁnances (for example, 13 December 1862, when news of the defeat at
Fredricksburg aﬀected the gold market). These events increased the price of gold. The
battles of Cedar Mountain (in the Peninsula campaign) and Gettysburg occurred on days
when the gold exchange was closed. For such events we use the ﬁrst subsequent trading
day. The variable dw takes a value −1 with news of Union victories, which reduced the
price of gold in greenbacks. It takes a value of 0 in other time periods. The events are
listed in Table 1.
7The second dummy variable is based on ﬁnancial news, described by Mitchell as
inﬂuencing gold prices, “since the ﬁrst condition of redeeming the paper currency was
ﬁnancial strength.”15 It is denoted df . It takes the value +1 at the dates of events which
expanded the greenback issue and raised the gold price (for example, 12 June 1862, when
the second Legal Tender Act was announced). It takes the value −1 at the dates of
successful loan issues or gold sales (for example, 25 March 1863, when news of Jay Cooke’s
bond sales on behalf of the Treasury reached the gold room). The associated events are
listed in Table 2.
To measure the news eﬀect we use the sample period from 1 May 1862 (by which
time greenbacks were in circulation) to 30 June 1865, which includes 962 observations.
Table 3 lists the results. In this period the mean daily return to holding gold was 0.0321
percent, with a standard error of 1.55. This same volatility is reﬂected in the least-squares
regression of equation (7), which has an R2 of only 0.079.
The coeﬃcient on dw (with t-statistic in brackets) is 1.94 (4.83) for the current value
and 0.86 (1.93) at one lag. For df the corresponding values are 1.43 (3.24) and 0.78
(2.95). This signiﬁcance is not surprising, for we have included all events listed by Mitchell
and presumably selected by him for their coincidence with changes in the price of gold.
However, the estimates can be used to quantify his idea. The estimated average eﬀect, after
two days, of each item of wartime news (dw) is 2.80 (6.09) and of each item of ﬁnancial
news (df ) is 2.22 (4.57). Including further lags shows some tendency for these positive
eﬀects to be reversed (suggesting that markets overreacted), but the sum remains positive
and signiﬁcant. Thus investors would have earned average, two-day returns of 2.80 percent
by holding gold at the time of Confederate victories and greenbacks when the Union won.
The cumulative eﬀects of these events over the entire war are revealing. In the case
of military news, the cumulative eﬀect of the Union losses listed on the left side of Table
1 was a 25.72 percent rise in the price of gold. Counting a further day of reaction to each
event reduces this value to 20.20 percent. The cumulative eﬀect of Union victories was
a 30.89 percent fall in the price of gold, or a 51.19 percent fall if returns are measured
over two days. Comparing one-day and two-day returns suggests that the gold room may
have over-reacted to Union defeats and under-reacted to Union victories. In the case of
8ﬁnancial news, the cumulative, two-day eﬀect of good news (20.67 percent) was almost
exactly oﬀset by bad news (20.84 percent).
Thus the net eﬀect of all the events highlighted by Mitchell was a fall in the price of
gold, of about 30 percent. The price actually rose by more than 30 percent during the War,
however, so other fundamentals must have driven up the gold price before 1865. Moreover,
while returns at Mitchell’s dates were large relative to mean returns, these factors account
for only 8 percent of the variation of returns during the period, when we constrain them to
have a common coeﬃcient. If, instead, we attach a separate dummy variable to each event,
then they explain 17 percent of the variation in returns. These ﬁndings are consistent with
property 1, but they do not allow us to separate the inﬂuence of these news events on
expectations about T from their potential eﬀect on the gold price through fundamentals.
In the next section we discuss a more direct test of property 1 for the postwar period.
Mitchell’s daily data have been examined also for the Civil War period by Kristen
Willard, Timothy Guinnane, and Harvey Rosen.16 Rather than measuring and testing for
changes at a given set of dates, they statistically identiﬁed dates at which jumps in the
gold price of greenbacks occurred and also carefully measured the duration of these eﬀects.
They found seven dates at which the intercept shifts in a time series model of the price.
Of these, the four dates which saw the largest percentage changes in the price also were
highlighted by Mitchell and are included in (dwt,d f t): 8 January 1863 when the House
Ways and Means Committee recommended a third Legal Tender Act; 6 July 1863, the
ﬁrst trading day after the battle of Gettysburg; 12 July 1864 when Jubal Early’s army
was near Washington; 8 March 1865 when Hugh McCulloch was nominated as Treasury
Secretary. Thus our measurements of the importance and scale of news eﬀects are unlikely
to be altered signiﬁcantly by focusing on the events identiﬁed statistically by Willard,
Guinnane, and Rosen as opposed to those listed by Mitchell.
It is possible that some of the military events listed in Table 1 did not aﬀect the
gold price, but simply happened to occur on days on which large price changes occurred
for some other reasons. One way to shed light on this possibility involves the price of
Confederate notes. If a piece of military news coincided with a fall in the gold value of the
greenback, say, and also coincided with a rise in the value of Confederate notes, then one
9is unlikely to attribute the change in the gold price to some other cause such as foreign
trade.
Two studies have found that the military news events in Table 1 did signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the value of Confederate notes. Richard Burdekin and Farrokh Langdana studied
ﬂuctuations in the commodity price of Confederate notes, at monthly frequency.17 They
concluded that war events accounted for much of the variations in that price. George
McCandless used a time series model, at bi-weekly frequency, and showed that the gold
values of greenbacks and of Confederate notes responded symmetrically to war news.18
These studies use dummy variables for wartime events, though the variables are not based
on Mitchell’s list. They perhaps could be augmented with df , to see whether Union ﬁscal
news also aﬀected the value of Confederate notes.
POSTWAR NEWS
Mitchell’s list of events ends in 1865; he had hoped to extend his study to 1879 but did
not. However, a list of postwar news events likely to inﬂuence expectations of resumption
and based strictly on primary sources is available. Richard Thompson constructed a set of
0/1 monthly dummy variables for the period from 1866 to 1878, basing his classiﬁcation
on news reported in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, The New York Times, and
The New York Herald-Tribune.19 His ﬁve dummy variables capture news events pertaining
to resumption, threats of foreign wars, crop and other real-sector news, gold corners, and
political changes respectively. The ﬁrst of these dummy variables is of particular interest
here, as its signiﬁcance should shed light on property 1 of the regime-switching model.
Indeed, this test should be more powerful than the test applied to the wartime period,
since Mitchell did not narrowly deﬁne events which aﬀected expectations about T.
We estimated equation (7), including Thompson’s ‘resumption-news’ dummy variable,
in postwar monthly returns. The dummy variable is insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
One mild disadvantage of the dummy-variable test is that it restricts the size of response
to be the same for all events. However, if the events were genuinely signiﬁcant then the
average response, measured in this way, would be too. Thus there is no evidence from
this speciﬁcation that news about the timing of resumption was reﬂected in the price of
10gold. Possibly many of the post-war legislative and political events which inﬂuenced the
price of gold were anticipated and hence discounted in advance. In contrast, the war news
described by Mitchell by its very nature might have been less easily anticipated.
Although the focus of this study is on resumption news, it is worth brieﬂy noting
that attempts to use dummy variables to answer other questions about the postwar gold
price also are unsuccessful. For example, in Thompson’s set of dummy variables only the
variable which measures news of foreign wars is individually signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. Moreover, the ﬁve dummy variables are jointly insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Bruce Phelps catalogued news which he suggested could be used to discriminate be-
tween two competing theories of greenback valuation.20 In one theory, the price can be
described by a monetary model of the exchange rate, as argued by Friedman and Schwartz
and Kindahl. In the other, the greenback’s value ﬂuctuates with information concerning
ﬁscal policy and expected future convertibility. Phelps argued that at certain news events
the price of gold should rise according to one theory and fall according to the other.
Phelps listed fourteen such news events in the period from 1864 to 1878.21 His list
includes the Public Credit Act, Grant’s veto in 1874 of a bill authorizing further greenback
issues, the Resumption Act, and Hayes’s inauguration. His dates also include March 1865,
a month which saw McCulloch nominated as Treasury Secretary. As noted earlier, Mitchell
attributed a large fall in the price of gold on 8 March 1865 to the nomination, Willard,
Guinnane, and Rosen found a break in the time series on that day, and it is included in
our wartime df . Phelps described how the price of gold should rise or fall with each event
under each theory. Based on his description, we created two +1/ − 1 dummy variables.
Each of these dummy variables is insigniﬁcant at even the 10 percent level in equation (7)
for the period from 1864 to 1878.
In seeking patterns in gold returns after 1865 we have so far tested only for a shift in the
return at speciﬁc dates, as suggested by property 1. More gradual eﬀects linked to potential
fundamentals were investigated by Charles Calomiris, who ﬁtted a vector autoregression
to monthly data for the period from March 1867 to December 1878. In his equation for
the greenback-gold return, current and lagged values of the supply of greenbacks, the ratio
of coin-denominated to greenback-denominated debt, an index of economic acitivity, net
11federal government debt, the commercial paper rate, and the wholesale price index were
each insigniﬁcant at even the 30 percent conﬁdence level.22 Calomiris concluded that the
greenback-gold price was best described as a random walk.
Thus, existing research has found no patterns in the gold price after 1865 which would
help economic historians discriminate among theories of its variation. We next develop
our own test for gradual eﬀects of expected resumption and apply it to the period during
which T was known.
AFTER THE RESUMPTION ACT
With the passage of the Resumption Act in January 1875, T was set at January 1879.
As a number of commentators have argued, gold returns prior to 1875 may have been
inﬂuenced by resumption expectations, in turn aﬀected by ﬁscal developments. However,
market participants had no reason to focus on the beginning of 1879 until the Resumption
Act. Our statistical model is based on that terminal date.
For the period from 1875 to 1879 we thus investigate whether the gold price departed
from a random walk in the way predicted by the process-switching model. That model
predicts that gold returns should decline over time (property 2), that they should decline
at an increasing rate (property 3), and that they should become less volatile (property 4).
To test whether returns had these properties, we study two samples. The ﬁrst begins
8 January 1875, the day after the House passed the Resumption Act. Grant’s approval on
14 January was expected and the Senate had passed the Act on 22 December 1874. This
sample ends 17 December 1878, when parity was permanently restored and the gold room
closed. It contains 1201 daily returns.
However, the survival and implementation of the legislation was by no means certain,
as Mitchell, for example, observed.23 Thus we also study a second sample which begins 5
March 1877, the day on which Hayes was inaugurated (4 March was a Sunday), naming
John Sherman as Secretary of the Treasury. This sub-sample contains 545 returns. Paul
Studenski and Herman Krooss described how Sherman added to the Treasury’s gold stock
to allow resumption, but emphasized other events which ensured that resumption occurred
on schedule.24 First, greenbackers failed to repeal the Resumption Act even though the
12retirement of greenbacks ceased. Second, large surpluses in agricultural trade with Europe
contributed to gold reserves. In fact, when the Treasury resumed gold payments on 2
January 1879 citizens presented more gold for conversion to paper money than the reverse.
To examine property 2, we regressed returns on a time trend to see if the conditional
mean return to holding gold declined over time. We found no signiﬁcant trend. As a test
of property 4, we regressed squared returns (approximately the variance plus a constant,
if there is no trend in the mean) on a time trend and found a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃ-
cient (with a t-ratio below −5 in both samples), as the theory would predict. Thompson
also documented this trend, using various measures of volatility.25 Thus there is some ev-
idence in favour of the theory. However, this trend in variance implies that errors in the
mean regression are not homoskedastic; thus our preliminary test of property 2 may be
problematic. We next allow for a trend in variance, and jointly test for properties 2-4 of
returns.
We have remained agnostic about the identity of the fundamental f and so we cannot
directly estimate the parameters in equations (3) and (6). As a simpler alternative, we
consider a discrete-time model which embodies the exponential paths in the mean and
variance which the theory predicts:







where  t is an independent, normally-distributed error term with mean zero and variance
σ2, and μ, α, and ω are parameters to be estimated. When t is much less than T, equation
(8) gives rt = μ +  t, so that the gold price follows a random walk with drift. As t
approaches T the mean return declines at an increasing rate if ω is positive (properties 2





which declines over time (property 4).
To ﬁnd an equation which can be estimated by standard statistical methods, we divide
by 1 − exp(t−T
α ) to give:
rt [1 − exp(
t − T
α
)]−1 =[ μ − ωexp(
t − T
α
)] [1 − exp(
t − T
α
)]−1 +  t. (10)
13This can be thought of as an example of weighted least squares. According to the theory,
later observations on returns are less variable; thus they receive higher weights in the
estimation of the trend in returns. We estimate equation (10) by maximum likelihood,
though, because the value of α is unknown and it appears on the left-hand side of the
equation.26 Although the sample ends at 17 December 1878, T is 1 January 1879, to
ensure that the divisor in equation (10) remains non-zero for all observations. We did not
include the news dummy variable because it was found to be insigniﬁcant for this period.
Table 4 gives the parameter estimates and t-ratios. There is no evidence that gold
returns declined more rapidly as resumption neared between 1875 and 1879, for ˆ ω is not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. In contrast, ˆ α is positive and signiﬁcant, so that the
volatility of returns did decline, as predicted by property 4 of the regime-switching model.
This decline was signiﬁcant economically, as well as statistically. The estimates from the
full sample imply that the variance of returns fell by 10 percent in the second half of 1877
and by 36 percent in the ﬁrst half of 1878.
Our ﬁndings illustrate Robert Merton’s demonstration that ﬁne observation intervals,
as in the daily data here, enhance precision in detecting patterns in the variance of returns
rather than in their mean.27 To provide more information on expected returns prior to
resumption, the regime-switching model here perhaps could be combined with evidence
on bond returns. Fisher noted that returns were higher on bonds denominated in gold
than on those denominated in greenbacks due to ‘the hope of resumption.’28 Richard Roll
and Calomiris have each estimated expected rates of change of the price of gold using this
diﬀerential.29 Calomiris found that the implied, expected appreciation of the greenback was
fastest during the second half of 1878, which is consistent with the hard landing property.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the regime-switching model provides a uniﬁed framework for
examining war-time events as well as the transition to resumption. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm
previous event studies of the greenback’s value during the Civil War, in the sense that mil-
itary and ﬁnancial news events had statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the signs predicted by
the theory. However, the economic signiﬁcance of these events should not be exaggerated,
14for they explain very little of the variation of gold returns, and their cumulative eﬀect can-
not explain the depreciation of the greenback during the War. It also is unclear whether
these news events inﬂuenced the gold price through expectations of the resumption date
or through fundamentals.
We also showed that discrete news events cannot explain the postwar movements in
the gold price. This negative ﬁnding applies whether news events were selected from the
contemporary press (by Thompson) or on the basis of theoretical models (by Phelps).
Possibly, these events were discounted in advance in the gold market. For example, there
may have been little uncertainty about the timing of resumption after the passage of the
Resumption Act in 1875.
Our tests of two properties of the regime-switching model for the period after the
Resumption Act yielded mixed results. There is no evidence of a decline in gold returns
(the hard landing property) as resumption neared, but there is some evidence of a decline
in the volatility of returns. This provides the ﬁrst statistical evidence, from the time series
of the exchange rate, in support of the widely held view that resumption expectations
inﬂuenced the value of the greenback.
The transition to some certainty of resumption between 1865 and 1875 remains an
historical puzzle. No study has identiﬁed news events or fundamentals which are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for gold returns during this period. However, the regime-switching model
also provides a framework for future investigation of this transition.
APPENDIX
Under a pure ﬂoat the average return is simply μ because the log price is a linear
function of fundamentals. Under equation (6) the drift in e(t) is found by applying Itˆ o’s
lemma, a rule for diﬀerentiation with respect to a continuous-time stochastic process. If
equation (6) gives e as a function denoted g(f,t), then




where subscripts denote partial derivatives. This gives
de = μe(f,t)dt + σe(f,t)dz,
15where the function μe is the expected return. Applying the Itˆ o diﬀerential operator in
(A1) to equation (6) gives









(T − t)]. (A2)
The drift term μe gives the conditional mean return to holding gold.
Property 1 Resumption news. Although we have not treated T as a random variable, the
eﬀect of news about T is simple to see. From equation (A2), dμe/dT > 0. Thus when T
is uncertain news which is believed to delay T will raise gold returns or lower the value of
the greenback.
Property 2 Declining gold returns. When resumption is not imminent returns ﬂuctuate
around μ.I f μ ≥ 0 and f>0 then as resumption nears the drift is negative and lower
than that under a free ﬂoat.
Property 3 Hard landing. The negative drift in gold returns would be a property of any
model of resumption. A more striking property can be shown by diﬀerentiating (A2) with
respect to t: the returns fall at an increasing rate as resumption nears, so that the largest
negative returns occur just prior to resumption.
What if there is negative drift in fundamentals f? That possibility is worth considering
because of the ﬁtful retirement of greenbacks, described by Richard Timberlake, and trends
in debt-management policy, which might lead to μ<0.30 In fact equation (A2) shows that
gold returns will be lower, and fall over time, with resumption expected even in this case
provided μ is not too negative. Large negative values for μ would make μe >μand imply
that resumption propped up the price of gold which otherwise would have fallen even more
rapidly. That possibility seems unlikely.
Property 4 Declining volatility of returns. Resumption expectations also inﬂuence the
variability of returns, in this model. Under a pure ﬂoat the variance of returns over
unit intervals is simply σ2. Along the path inﬂuenced by expected future resumption the
variance is:
σ2




16which declines over time.
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Source: Daily prices are from Mitchell, Gold, appendix table 1.Figure 2: Simulated Gold Prices after the Resumption Act





























random walk with drift
simulated price
Note:  The dashed line shows 1202 observations on levels of a simulated random walk with 
a daily drift of -0.0000001 and a variance of 0.000002.  The solid line shows 1201 observations 
on levels of a simulated gold price, beginning at the actual price on 8 Januaru 1875 and
constructed from equation (6) using the simulated random walk and a = 500.Figure 3: Actual Gold Prices after the Resumption Act



































Note: The figure shows 1201 daily gold prices from 8 January 1875 to 17 December 1878.
Source: Actual daily prices are from Mitchell, Gold, appendix table 1.TABLE 1
WAR NEWS (dw)
+1 (Gold price up) −1 (Gold price down)
11 Aug 1862 Cedar Mountain 30 July 1862 British non-intervention news
30 Aug 1862 Second Bull Run 10 Feb 1863 peace rumour
3 Sept 1862 Jackson in Baltimore rumour 6 July 1863 Gettysburg
13 Dec 1862 Fredericksburg 7 July 1863 Vicksburg surrender
1 Apr 1863 Yazoo expedition 15 July 1863 Port Hudson
5-7 May 1863 Chancellorsville 23-25 Nov 1863 Chattanooga
20 Sept 1863 Chickamauga 3 Sept 1864 Atlanta
3 May 1864 French troops in Mexico 19 Jan 1865 peace rumour
11 July 1864 Early near Washington 14 March 1865 Sherman news
28 Dec 1864 Fort Fisher 16 March 1865 Richmond rumour
19 June 1865 British non-recognition
Notes: The dummy variable dw takes the value +1 at news of Union defeats or adverse
rumors, listed in the left column. It takes the value −1 at Union victories (or favorable
political news), listed in the right column.
Source: Mitchell, History, part II, chapter III.TABLE 2
WARTIME FINANCIAL NEWS (df )
+1 (Gold price up) −1 (Gold price down)
12 June 1862 second legal tender act announced 17 Mar 1863 Treasury gold sales approved
8 July 1862 ﬁnal vote on second act 25 Mar 1863 Cooke bond sales success
8 Jan 1863 WM recommends third act 15-21 Apr 1863 Chase gold sales
14 Jan 1863 House resolution on third act 20 May 1863 Chase gold sales
17 Jan 1863 army pay crisis 22 Oct 1863 foreign loan rumour
26 Jan 1863 House passes third legal tender act 10 Sept 1864 successful loan issue
16 Apr 1863 Senate passes gold bill 8 Mar 1865 McCulloch’s nomination
14 June 1863 House passes gold bill
Notes: The dummy variable df takes the value +1 at news of diﬃculties in Union ﬁnances,
such as further issues of greenbacks, listed in the left column. It takes the value −1a t
news of favorable developments in Union public ﬁnance, listed in the right column.
Source: Mitchell, History, part II, chapter III.TABLE 3
WARTIME NEWS AND GOLD RETURNS
(May 1862–June 1865)








Notes: r is the daily percentage change in the greenback price of gold. The constant
term is insigniﬁcant. There is no signiﬁcant residual autocorrelation. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and are constructed by the Newey-
West method with two lags and damping parameter 1 so as to ensure a positive deﬁnite
variance-covariance matrix.
Source: Daily prices are from Mitchell, Gold, appendix, Table 1; dummy variables are
from Tables 1 and 2.TABLE 4
THE RESUMPTION ACT AND GOLD RETURNS








8 January 1875 – 17 December 1878 5 March 1877 – 17 December 1878
(N=1201) (N=545)
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
α 110.86 11.97 280.45 0.01
μ -0.01 -1.89 -0.00012 -0.01
ω -0.01 -1.72 0.806 0.03
σ 0.202 41.58 0.202 2.66
Notes: r is the daily percentage change in the greenback price of gold. Estimation is by
maximum likelihood.
Source: Daily prices are from Mitchell, Gold, appendix, Table 1.